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FRINGE BENEFITS:
Was Ben Franklin Right?
by Eric G. Nielsen
Benjamin Franklin once said, "Our Constitution is in actual operation; everything appears to promise that it will last; but in this
world nothing is certain but death and taxes;'
Recent tax policy suggests that Ben may have
been only half right. Employers in the private
sector contributed over $112 billion for
employee pensions, profit-sharing, and group
insurance in 1981. If federal income taxes had
been collected on this amount, tax revenue
would have increased by approximately $34
billion. Instead, Social Security tax revenues
were lowered by an additional $14 billion
(Long and Scott 1984, p. 191). Therefore, taxing fringes could have raised federal revenues
by $48 billion, had no change in total
em ployee compensation resulted from
broadening the tax base. With these kinds of
figure s, it is no surprise that fringe benefits
and their tax status have been under great
scruti ny in recent years.
Favorable tax treatment of employee
benefits is almost as old as the income tax
itsel f (Munnell 1984, p. 46). These benefits
came from contributions made by employers
who could write them off as expenses. The
benefits were also tax free to the employee
because they were loo ked upon as gratuities
more than wage compensation, but this also
meant that they could be discontinued at the
whim of the employer. However, the status of
fringe benefits has greatly changed since the
early part of this century. No longer considered gratuities but rather a necessity in
labor co ntracts, fringe benefits have become
a significant part of the labor scene, and their
effects on government revenue have become
signi fican t as well.

Why Do We Have Fringe Benefits?
A benefit paid " in-kind" is worth no more

(and probably less) to the employee than the
retail price of similar items. So why are these
benefits given to employees? There are many
reasons why fringe benefits are paid.
First, the fringe may contribute to the productive output of the firm, as in the case of
a company car that enables a traveling sales
representative to increase sales. Second, the
employer may be able to provide the fringe
benefit at a cost less than the price of the good
in the retail market. A third reason is tax
avoidance. The current tax treatment of fringe
benefits creates substantial incentives for firms
and workers to change the mix of fringe
benefits and wages that would be chosen in
a world wit h no taxes. When a fringe benefit
is taxed at a value greater than that actually
placed on it by workers, the workers are
motivated to substitute away from the benefit
despite the real advantages that come about
by employer supply (Katz and Mankiw March
1985, p. 38). The opposite is true when benefits
are taxed at a value below that which the
workers value. Fourth, fringe benefits are supplied in order to keep labor turnover costs
down. Olivia Mitchell has done empirical
studies with a recent Quality of Employment
Survey.1 In her work she concluded that mobility is lower for workers with fringe benefits. A
male worker with a pension plan is IO percent
less likely to quit than his counterpart without
a pension. She also concluded that females are
less responsive to the loss of fringe benefits
than are males (Mitchell 1982, p. 291). Higher
wages reduce a worker's quit probability, but
this effect is cut in half when fringe benefits
are considered. Sturlies which ignore fringe
benefits as a deterrent to quits overstate the
effects of wages. A fifth reason for providing
fringe benefits is their preferential treatment
under corporate tax laws. The Revenue Act of
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1943 allows payments by employers to pension
funds and insurance benefits to be deductible
from the employer's gross income for tax purposes (Woodbury 1983, p. 167).
As Table 1 shows, fringe benefits have increased from 12.6 to 28.5 percent of total
worker compensation from 1950 to 1983. Part
of this growth has com e from additional paid
holidays, which are then included in the income and payroll tax base. Some of the increase is due to factors beyond employer control, such as Social Security contributions and
additional unemployment compensation. The
main area of concern, however, is the growth
of benefits and the resulting shrinkage of the
tax base due to " agreed-upon" benefits. These
benefits allow workers to skirt payroll and income taxes until retirement and perhaps
beyond. The major fringe benefits in this area
are pensions, health insurance, and life
insurance.

deficit and the problems of the Social Security Fund have led many economists to argue
that fringe benefits should be taxed. However,
politically this has proven very difficult to
achieve since recipients of fringe benefits do
not want them taxed. On the other hand, those
who are self-employed or otherwise unable to
receive fringe benefits and tax breaks have
been forced to pick up the slack with increased marginal tax rates that have been implemented to maintain government revenues.
A question arises, however; if these people ever
did get the support of Congress to tax fringe
benefits, how would it be done?

Valuing Fringe Benefits
Most people would probably consider a person's income to be the best way to measure
ability to help share the cost of government.
. Most tax specialists rely on the definition of
income provided by Robert Haig and Henry
Simons: "Income is the money value of the

The rapid growth of fringe benefits coupled
with the recent controversy over the federal

Table l

Wage and Nonwage Compensation from 1950 to 1983
COMPENSATION

1950

1960

1970

1980

1983

$1559.6
1356.6

$1991.6
1663.9

(In billions o f dollars)
Total Compensation
Wages and Salaries

$154.8
147.0

$294.9
271.9

$612.0
548.7

(As a Percent of Total Compensation)
No nwage Com pensation
Legally Required (a)
Agreed-upon (b)
Wages fo r Time
Not Worked

5.0%
2.4
2.6

7.8%
3.6
4.4

10.3%
4.4
6.0

15.3%
6.4
8.9

16.5%
6.7
9.8

7.6

9.5

10.8

11.7

12.0

(a) OASDHI (Social Security), Unemployment Compensation, Wo rker's Compensation
(b) Government Pensions, Private Pensions, Profit Sharing, Gro up Health, Group Life, Other
Source: Munnell 1984, p. 40. (Stati stics from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
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net increase to an individual's power to consume during a period. This is equal to the
amount actually consumed during the period
plus net additions to wealth" (Rosen 1985, p.
336). Defini ng income in this broad manner
insures that taxpayers with equal economic
resources are assessed equal amounts of taxes
and those with different capabilities are assessed different amounts.
When valuing these benefits fo r tax purposes, should their fair market price be used,
or the amount of reduction in cash wages that
an employee would accept to get the benefits?
The latter alternative is a subjective method,
whic h would lead to varying values of identical benefits. John Nolan correctly stated,
"The accretion to wealth is the same for all
employees regardless of the individual's
marginal utility for the particular type of
economic benefit. The tax system should provi de an objective standard for quantifying income to provide equity among taxpayers"
(Nolan 1977, p. 361). Employees receiving
identical benefits should, in principle, be taxed on the same basis. Two employees, each
receiving in-kind housing should not have differen t tax consequences because one cares less
about the quality of housing. T he employee
receives the housing because, for various
reasons, the employer provides such housing
with no option to the employee to take cash
instead.
By including fringe benefits as part of the
income, a nd valuing them at market prices,
some problems occur. What about an airli ne
fli ght attendant who rides on a "seatavailable'' basis? Should the attendant be taxed at the market price for a tic ket on the
flig ht? The employer, in the short term, incurs
no additional cost as the fligh t will be flown
whether the attendant rides in the empty seat
or not. How else can a n empty airline seat be
val ued? The fair market value standard, while
objective, is not self-executing. Market value
may be determined in urban areas for parking, but in rural areas, where parki ng is free,
the value must be considered zero. A ll fringe
benefits must then have a va lue of zero unless
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they represent a cost the employee otherwise
would have incurred to obtain the fringe
benefit (Nolan 1977, p. 362). Employer costs
cannot be used to measure benefit in the free
parking situation as the costs have occurred to
provide assistance fo r the business and
employee benefit is incidental. Therefore any
fringe benefit falling into the category of "appropriate" or "helpful" for the emp loyer's
business should be excluded from the worker's
income. These benefits, along with other
miscellaneous benefits which accumulate no
substantial amount, are often called de
minimis benefits. Currently, these de minimis
items are not taxed, but the reason for this
status comes fro m more than just valuation
problems. If the benefits are so small, they are
probably excused j ust to ease the administrative nightmare that would be involved in taxing them.

The Welfare Costs of Fringe Benefits
People on the street would be puzzled by the
welfare Joss of fringe benefits. "How can you
lose welfare? Labor gets a bunch of extras on
top of wages!" Yet it is true that fringe
benefits, economically speaking, create net
welfare losses, as is the case with other for ms
of subsidy. Viewing this situation from the tax
side, fringe benefits are tax loopholes that
lower relative prices, a nd, as a result, substitution will be induced from wages to fringe
benefits which will lead to a greater welfare
cost as shown in Figure l.
The horizontal axis measures the quantity of
fringe benefits, all treated as having a price of
$1.00. Let D ,(., ,) be the demand curve for the
deductible and excluded items for all taxpayers
in the 15 percent marginal tax bracket, and
D 2 (. 28 ) be the demand curve for taxpayers in
the 28 percent marginal tax bracket. If no
deductions or exclusions were allowed, at a
price of $1 per unit , Q would be consumed by
taxpayers in the 15 percent bracket, and Q*
by those in the 28 percent group. With deductions and excl usio ns permitted (fringe
benefits), however, and assuming that the ad-
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ditional output can be provided at a constant
cost, the effective price of the subsidized items
would fall in proportion to the taxpayers' effective marginal tax brackets, in this case by
15 percent and 28 percent. At the lower prices,
Q , and Q** respectively are consumed. For
the 15 percent group the welfare cost, or the
excess of costs (QADQ ,) over the benefits
(QABQ ,), is shown by the triangle BAD.
Similarly, the welfare cost for taxpayers in the
28 percent marginal tax bracket is triangle
KLM, (Q*KLQ** - Q*KMQ**) (Browning
1979, 202). In this constant cost situation, the
welfare
lost
can
be
figured
as
WL= ½ (hP,Q ,t ' ) where his the elasticity of
demand, P, is the original price ($1.00), Q , is
the original quantity (either Q or Q*) and
t is the marginal tax rate.
Browning estimated that in 1971 the welfare
loss of fringe benefits was $998,300,000!
(Browning 1979, p. 202). Even this welfare cost
may be understated, however, due to the fact

that Browning's study did not take into account state and other taxes which also allow
the same deductions. The absence of fringe
benefits could lead to higher Medicare and
related costs and would diminish this amount.

Determination of Utility
of Fringe Benefits
Yet another determinant to be considered is
the level of utility a person may receive from
fringe benefits or cash wages. If workers are
paid with wages only, they will spend a certain fraction of this amount to purchase
benefits even if they are not preferentially taxed. These purchases might include life insurance, medical insurance, and dental insurance. These can be purchased either
through the employer or from private sources.
Any benefit which a worker purchases will not
be transferable. The worker can use wages to
buy benefits, but not vice versa. This is

Figure 1

The Welfare Loss from Fringe Benefits
PRICE

.85

D,(.28)

0

Q

Q*

Source: Browning 1979, p. 202.

Q**

QUANTITY

Eric G. Nielsen

realistic to assume since most benefits cannot
be sold. Again, assuming that workers are paid
only wages, they will buy benefits as long as
the marginal rate of substitution of wages fo r
benefits is greater than one (MRSwb > 1). This
will continue until the point where the
marginal rate of substitution equals one
(MRSwb =l). The curves g,, g,, and g, in
Figure 2 are indifference curves. Each of them
intersects t he curved line OA where its slope
is -1. If the worker is given wages alone, or any
combination of wages and benefits lying along
line segment WB, exchanges of wages and
benefits can be made by moving along WB in
a downward direction only (Halperin and Tzur
1985, p. 67). Given an endowment of wages
and benefits on line EB, the optimal strategy
would be to keep the present endowment since
any movement down EB would reduce utility.
Indeed, although fringe benefits may be tax
free, after point E, a person would rather have
cash and pay the tax on it than receive additional benefits. This may occur in spite of real
advantages of employer-supplied benefits. At
the same time, utility levels may vary when
leisure is figured into the market picture.
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ty function and, therefore, cannot determine
the optimal amount of benefits to pay the
worker. One way the employer can deal with
this problem is to let the worker choose the
level of benefits by o ffering a cafeteria plan.

The Cafeteria Plan of Fringe Benefits
The "cafeteria" or flexible benefit plan permits an employee to select fringe benefits from
a package of employer-provided benefits.
Employer contributions to a cafeteria plan are
excluded from taxable income if the employee
chooses nontaxable benefits. Employees have
a choice of alternative benefits; cash must also
be offered as an alternative to nontaxable
benefits on a dollar for dollar basis
(Adamache and Sloan 1985, p. 60). Therefore,
cafeteria plans which offer nontaxable benefits
effectively permit the employee to purchase
bene fits with before tax dollars. By choosing
benefits under the plan, the employee is using before tax dollars to maximize utility. The
effects of a cafeteria plan are shown in Figure
3.
Suppose at first the employer does not offer the worker a cafeteria plan or any other

An employer does not know a worker's utili-

Figure 2

Figure 3
Cafeteria Plan Effects
on Worker Utility

Fringe Benefit Indifference Curves
WAGES
WAGES
w
w'

0

B

BENEFITS

Source: Halperin and Thur 1985, p. 68.

0

8

c

BENEFITS

Source: Halperin and Thur 1985, p. 74.
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benefi ts, and that the wage is w*. Given the
analysis mentioned ea rlier, the worker will
move downwa rd along line w* B, which has a
slope of -1 , until the tangency point with g,.
Now suppose the employer offers the worker
a cafeteria plan where the maximum amount
of benefits offered under the plan is be. The
new budget line for the worker is the kinked
line w*AC which has a slope of -(1-t) for segment w*A, and -1 for segment AC (Halperin
and Tzur 1985 , p. 74). The worker' s maximum
g is now g ,. Since g, is higher than g, , the
employer is now in a position to negotiate the
amount of additional work effort requ ired.
The cafeteria plan is really the firs t step in a
two step process. In the first step, the employer
allows the worker to choose benefits under the
plan. The second step is the requirement of additional work from the employee. In one possible scenario, the employer will be unable to
get any extra work from the employee. Since
the plan is virtually costless, however, the
employer will not reduce expected profits by
offering it. In a more usual case, expectations
are that both parties will share the advantages
of the plan (Halperin and Tzur 1985, p. 75).
The work effort will increase, but not enough
to offset the additional utility or well being obtained from the plan.

Fringe Benefit Effects
on Labor Mobility
In addition to the Mitchell analysis mentioned earlier, firm-attachment analysis needs
to look at three benefit characteristics that also
affect labor mobility: vesting, benefit formulas, and retirement eligibility. Vesting refers
to the attachment of irrevocable rights to later
pension benefits. Once vested, a worker can
leave a firm and still collect pension benefits
at the eligible retirement age. Generally, a
worker becomes vested after working a
specified number of years for one firm . If the
worker should leave the fir m before that time,
and is not vested, accumulated pension credits
are nullified. One would instinctively think
that the quit rate of workers would fall as they

approach vesting (due to pension ioss), and
then rise after vesting because the threat of
pension loss is gone. Quits am o ng younger
workers would probably increase, due to
stringent vesting requirements as the discounted expected value of pension benefits is
very low for workers who must wait many
years for vested status.
T he size of pension benefits will depend o n
a firm 's pension formula. A common formula
takes the for m B=k · Y · E., where B is the
mont hly retirement benefi t, k is a constant, Y
refers to yea rs of service, and E is monthly
earn ings (Schiller and Weiss I979, p. 370).
Higher benefit levels (8 ) should increase quits
among those eligible for retirement and
reduce quit s fo r other workers, ceteris paribus.
The third important structural feature of
pension plans is the age and years of service
at which a worker becomes eligible for early
or normal reti rement. At normal retirement,
a wo rker can leave work and start to receive
a full pension benefit. In most companies, the
worker m ust leave at normal retirement
eligibility, since it is the time at which retirement is mandatory. Most companies also
define a status called early retirement, at which
a worker becomes eligible for benefits at some
point before the normal retirement age. The
early retirement benefit is lower than the normal one, however, because acc umulated years
of service are fewer and companies often actuarially reduce the benefit to take account of
the longer expected life span over which it will
be received. A reduction in retirement age
clearly increases both the probability of pension receipt and the period over which it will
be received, and thus should restrai n quits by
yo unger workers and encourage quits among
older workers (Schiller and Weiss 1979, p. 370).
Schiller's and Weiss 's analysis does not take into account Social Security benefits. These
benefits wo uld help encourage a higher quit
rate among older workers as well, especially
if vested or qualified for early retirement.

Effects of Ronald Reagan's Tax Cut
A key feature of the Economic Recovery
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and Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) was a 25 percent
reduction in the federal personal income tax
phased in over three years. By reducing
marginal tax rates, ERTA has reduced the incentive employees have to demand compensation in nonwage form. Browning found in her
studies that marginal tax rates will affect the
level of fringe benefits people will take in place
of cash wage compensation (Browning 1979,
p. 205). The tax cut also increased disposable
income directly by reducing the tax burden,
and perhaps indirectly as well, by stimulating
aggrega te economic activity. Killard
Adamache did a regression analysis which
revealed that, by holding marginal tax rates
constant, higher income reduces contributions
to life and health insurance plans slightly, but
increases contrib ution s to private pension
plans markedl y. He found that the employer
contributions were quite responsive to changes
in marginal tax rates. He claimed that ERTA
legislation reduced demand for life and health
insurance by five percent through 1985 from
what the levels would have been without ERTA's tax reductions (Adamache and Sloan
1985 , p. 53). The actual effects of the Reagan
cuts and the 1987 tax reform measures are not
currently available, but it is obvious that the
potential effects are significant. The results
will depend to a large extent on the rate of income growt h through this decade.

Conclusions
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situation will probably continue for many
years to come, and poor Ben Franklin will have
only been correct on one of life's certainties.

Note
1The QES was conducted by the Michigan Survey Research
Center. It looked at employment characteristics of 530 men
and 252 women who were interviewed between 1973 and
1977.
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